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Abstract—Energy theft causes large economic losses to utility
companies around the world. In recent years, energy theft
detection approaches based on machine learning (ML) tech-
niques, especially neural networks, are becoming popular in
the research community and shown to achieve state-of-the-art
detection performance. However, in this work, we demonstrate
that the well-trained ML models for energy theft detection
are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In particular, we
design an adversarial measurement generation approach that
enables the attacker to report extremely low power consumption
measurements to utilities while bypassing the ML energy theft
detection. We evaluate our approach with three kinds of neural
networks based on a real-world smart meter dataset. The
evaluation results demonstrate that our approach is able to
significantly decrease the ML models’ detection accuracy, even
for black-box attackers.
Index Terms—energy theft detection, power grid, adversarial
machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the primary non-technical losses (NTL) in
the power systems, energy theft happens when an attacker
deliberately manipulates his/her electricity data to reduce the
electricity bills. To date, energy theft causes high financial
losses to electric utility companies around the world. It is
estimated that up to $6 billion of electricity is stolen (around
1% to 3% annual revenue) in the United States each year [1],
and the loss can be larger in developing countries [2].
In recent years, with the development of advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI), two-way data communications between
customers and utilities are enabled by the deployment of smart
meters. However, recent studies demonstrated that the data
communication facilities of AMI introduce new vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by the attackers to launch energy
theft [3]. Meanwhile, the smart meters are also shown to
be vulnerable to physical penetration [4], and there are even
video tutorials online on smart meter hacking [5]. Therefore,
the energy theft problem is serious and the corresponding
detection approaches are needed.
Different approaches were proposed to detect and mitigate
energy theft. In general, the detection approaches can be
categorized into two classes, sensor-based and consumption
profile-based. The sensor-based approaches require the de-
ployment of extra equipment and will increase the mainte-
nance costs while the profile-based approaches utilize the cus-
tomers’ power usage patterns to detect the abnormal variations
[3]. Among the profile-based approaches, detection methods
that employ machine learning (ML) techniques, especially
deep neural networks (DNN), are becoming popular in the
research community [3] [6]–[9]. Enabled by the AMI, ML-
based approaches take advantage of the statistical properties
of the massive fine-grained smart meter data as a whole and
achieve state-of-the-art detection performances. Meanwhile,
the ML detection schemes are purely data-driven without
additional equipment, which makes it compatible with current
infrastructures in the power systems.
However, recent studies in the computer vision domain have
demonstrated that ML models are highly vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks [10]–[13]. By adding well-crafted perturbations
to the legitimate inputs, the attacker is able to deceive the
well-trained ML models to output the wrong classification
results. In addition, the adversarial attacks are also shown
to be effective in power systems applications [14]–[16]. As
the ML approaches become popular in detecting energy theft,
the threat from adversarial attacks need to be investigated to
prevent potential financial losses.
In general, the process to generate adversarial examples can
be represented as an optimization problem. The adversarial
perturbations in the computer vision domain are expected
to be small enough to avoid being noticed by human eyes.
However, such a constraint is not suitable to a ‘smart’ energy
thief. In particular, the attacker needs to generate a small
energy consumption measurement to reduce his/her bill while
bypassing the utilities’ energy theft detection.
In this work, from the attacker’s point of view, we study
the reliability of ML models used for energy theft detection.
We analyze and formulate the properties of adversarial attacks
in energy theft detection and propose a general threat model.
Meanwhile, we design and implement an adversarial measure-
ment generation algorithm that maximizes the attacker’s profit.
The evaluation of a real-world smart meter dataset shows that
our algorithm can generate extremely low fake measurements
while bypassing the well-trained ML detection models, even
for black-box attackers. The main contribution of this paper
can be summarized as follows:
• We highlight the potential risks of adversarial attacks on
ML-based energy theft detection.
• We analyze and summarize the properties of adversarial
measurements in energy theft detection and propose a
general threat model.
• We design an adversarial measurement generation algo-
rithm to maximize the attackers’ profit, we name the
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algorithm the SearchFromFree algorithm.
• We evaluate our algorithm with three kinds of neural
networks that trained with real-world smart meter data.
The evaluation results demonstrate that our algorithm
generates extremely small fake measurements that can
still successfully bypass the ML models’ detection. We
open-source the related source code on Github [17].
Related research is discussed in Section II. After that, we
format the attack and present the threat model in Section
III. Section IV and V present the algorithm design and the
experiment evaluations respectively. We discuss the future
work in section VI. Finally, section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. ML-based Energy Theft Detection
In 2009, Nagi et al. utilized the support vector machine
(SVM) to detect abnormal power usage behaviors based on
historian consumption data [18]. After that, Depuru et al.
extend their approach and introduce more information, such
as the type of consumer, geographic location, to train the
SVM classifier [19]. Meanwhile, SVM can also be combined
with other techniques, such as a fuzzy inference system [20]
and decision tree [21], to increase the detection performance.
In 2015, Jokar et al. generated a synthetic attack dataset
and trained a multiclass SVM classifier for each customer to
detect malicious power consumption [7]. Recently, detection
approaches based on deep neural networks become popular
and achieves promising performance. In 2017, Zheng et al. [9]
firstly employed deep convolutional neural networks trained
by a dataset released by State Grid Corporation of China
(SGCC) and achieved high detection accuracy and low false-
negative rate. After that, in 2018, a deep recurrent neural
network was employed in [6] for energy theft detection. They
train the RNN with daily smart meter data and randomly
search for the appropriate model parameters. Besides the
consumption domain, attackers may also claim higher supplied
energy and overcharge the utilities in the smart grid to make
a profit, such as through photovoltaic solar cells. [22] inves-
tigated the energy theft attack in the distributed generation
domain and utilized a hybrid neural network to detect such
attacks. More related work on the ML-based energy theft
detection can be found in [23].
B. Adversarial Attacks
The effect of the adversarial examples was firstly discovered
in the computer vision domain by Szegedy et al. in 2013 [10].
They found that by adding a small crafted perturbation that
is imperceptible to human eyes, the attacker can deceive the
ML models to output the wrong classification result. More-
over, the same perturbation is transferable in different ML
models. After that, different perturbation generation algorithm
was proposed, such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method by
Goodfellow et al. [11], Fast Gradient Method by Rozsa et
al. [12], and DeepFool by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [13]. In
recent years, the threat of adversarial attacks to power system
applications also drew more and more attention. In 2018, Chen
et al. demonstrated that adversarial examples are effective
in both classification and regression ML applications in the
power systems [16]. After that, Liu et al. studied the effect of
adversarial attacks on neural network-based state estimation
[15]. In 2020, [14] demonstrated that the attacker can easily
bypass the ML-based false data injection detection under the
physical constraints. In [24], Marulli et al. studied the data
poisoning attacks to ML models in energy theft detection
using the generative adversarial network (GAN). However,
they did not consider the evasion attacks and the profit of
the attackers.
III. ATTACK FORMATION
A. Mathematical Presentation
In this paper, we consider the scenario that the utilities
employ an ML model fθ to detect energy theft based on
the customers’ power consumption measurements. The model
fθ :M → Y maps the measurement vector M to its label Y
(Normal, Malicious) and is trained with the dataset {M,Y }.
The energy thief is assumed to be able to compromise his/her
electricity meter and freely modify the meter’s measurement.
The purpose of the energy thief is to launch a false-negative
evasion adversarial attack to fθ by generating malicious mea-
surement vectors A so that fθ(A)→ Normal. Different from
the general adversarial attacks which require the adversarial
perturbations to be small. In the energy theft problem, the
attacker only needs to focus on the size of A in order to
minimize his/her electricity bills. Therefore, the adversarial
attacks in energy theft detection can be formally represented
as follow:
min ‖a‖1 (1a)
s.t. fθ(a)→ Normal (1b)
ai ≥ 0 (1c)
where a represents a specific adversarial measurement vec-
tor, ‖a‖1 =
∑
ai is the L1-Norm of a. The constraint (1c)
requires all the power consumption measurement ai in a must
be non-negative to be feasible.
B. Threat Model
We propose a practical threat model for the adversarial
attacks in energy theft detection.
• We assume the attacker is able to compromise his/her
electricity meter and can freely modify the meter mea-
surements. In practice, this can be achieved by physical
penetration.
• We consider a black-box adversarial attack since the
energy thief usually cannot access the ML model fθ and
training dataset {M,Y } owned by the utilities. However,
we allow the attacker to obtain an alternative dataset
{M ′, Y ′}, such as a historian dataset, to train his/her
model f ′θ′ to generate adversarial measurements.
• As demonstrated by (1c), the attacker needs to generate
non-negative adversarial measurements in order to be
practical.
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In addition to the black-box attacks described above, we
will also evaluate the attack performance in the white-box
scenario that allows the attacker to access the full ML model
fθ. As presented by the Kerckhoffs’s principle in cryptogra-
phy, such evaluation can demonstrate the vulnerability of the
detection system under the worst-case scenario and allow us to
learn the upper bound performance of the adversarial attacks.
IV. SEARCHFROMFREE ALGORITHM DESIGN
Based on our threat model, we propose the design of
the SearchFromFree algorithm to generate valid adversarial
measurement vectors A that can deceive the ML model
fθ. Our algorithm assumes the attacker trained his/her local
ML model f ′θ′ with an alternative dataset, such as a public
historian dataset. The assumption behinds our approach is
the transferability of adversarial examples. Similar to the
DeepFool algorithm [13], our algorithm is gradient-based and
iteratively searches for a valid a.
Algorithm 1: SearchFromFree Algorithm
1 Input: f ′θ′ , step, size, λ, σ
2 Output: a
3 function advGen(f ′θ′ , step, size, λ, σ)
4 define Ltotal = L(f ′θ′(a), Ya)− λ · ‖a‖1
5 initialize a ∼ N(0, σ2)
6 set all negative elements in a to zero
7 initialize stepNum = 0
8 while stepNum ≤ step− 1 do
9 if f ′θ′(a)→ Normal then
10 return a
11 end
12 calculate gradient G = ∇aLtotal
13 r = G · size/max(abs(G))
14 update a = a+ r
15 set all negative elements in a to zero
16 stepNum = stepNum+ 1
17 end
18 return a
19 end
As shown in Algorithm 1, the advGen function has five
inputs, including the local ML model f ′θ′ , and four positive
constant parameters. The constant step limits the maximum
number of search iteration while size defines the maximum
modifications of a in each iteration. It is obvious that the
energy thief’s bill amount from the utilities is approximately
linear (consider the various electricity price) to ‖a‖1, the
L1-norm of a. In order to maximize the attackers’ profit,
we add a regularization item λ · ‖a‖1 to the loss Ltotal.
We employ a constant λ to represent the compromisation
between the attack success rate and the attacker’s bill amount.
Therefore, λ should be carefully tuned according to specific
attack scenarios. As shown by Line 5 of Algorithm 1, we
empirically initialize a according to a Gaussian distribution
with a zero mean value, which indicates a zero amount (free)
bill for the energy thief. The intuition behind this is that
the search iteration process will gradually increase ‖a‖1 to
a normal measurement vector that has a higher probability to
bypass the detection. Therefore, a small initial a will finally
lead to a smaller ‖a‖1 so that the attacker can make more
profit. The perturbation r generated from the loss gradient
may cause negative measurements in a. Therefore, as shown
by Line 6 and 15, we set all negative values to zero to generate
a feasible adversarial measurement vector a.
V. SIMULATION IMPLEMENTATION
A. Dataset
We utilize the smart meter data published by the Irish Social
Science Data Archive (ISSDA) [25] as it is widely used as
a benchmark for energy theft detection in related literatures
[3][6]–[8]. The dataset contains the smart meter energy con-
sumption measurement data of over 5000 customers in the
Irish during 2009 and 2010. The customers agreed to install
the smart meters and participated in the research project.
Therefore, we assume all the measurement data in the dataset
are normal and there is no energy theft. There are missing and
illegal measurements in the original dataset. We pre-process
the raw dataset by removing the incomplete measurements.
We then regulate the time-series measurement data into daily
reading vectors and obtain dataset Ddaily. As the smart meters
recorded every 30 minutes, each daily vector will contain 48
measurements.
Table I: Energy Theft Attack Scenarios [3]
Attack Scenario
h1(mt) = αmt, α ∼ Uniform(0.1, 0.8)
h2(mt) = βtmt, βt ∼ Uniform(0.1, 0.8)
h3(mt) =
{
0 ∀t ∈ [ti, tf ]
mt ∀t /∈
[
ti, tf
]
h4(mt) = E(m)
h5(mt) = βtE(m)
h6(mt) = m24−t
However, there is a shortage of real-world energy theft
dataset. To solve this, we employ the false measurement data
generation approach proposed in [3] to simulate the energy
theft measurements. As shown in Table I, [3] presents six
energy theft scenarios. The first attack h1 multiples the real
meter reading with a constant while h2 with random constant
generated from a uniform distribution. The h3 assumes the
energy thief reports zero consumption during a period. The
fourth scenario happens when the attacker constantly reports
the mean consumption. h5 is similar to h2 but multiples the
random constant with the mean value instead of the real
measurements. At last, h6 reverses the records of a day so
that low measurements will be reported during periods whose
electricity price is lower.
We generate a synthetic dataset based on the regulated daily
smart meter dataset. We firstly randomly sample 180,000 daily
records from Ddaily and pollute half records in the sample
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Table II: Model Structures
Networks FNN RNN CNN
Models fFNN f ′FNN fRNN f
′
RNN fCNN f
′
CNN
Layer 0 input 48 input 48 input 48× 1 input 48× 1 input 6× 8 input 6× 8
Layer 1 128 Dense 168 Dense 256 LSTM 246 LSTM 128 Conv2D 156 Conv2D
Layer 2 256 Dense 328 Dense Dropout 0.25 Dropout 0.25 128 Conv2D 214 Conv2D
Layer 3 128 Dense 168 Dense 168 LSTM 148 LSTM MaxPooling2D (2,2) MaxPooling2D (2,2)
Layer 4 Dropout 0.25 128 Dense Dropout 0.25 Dropout 0.25 Dropput 0.25 Dropput 0.25
Layer 5 32 Dense Dropout 0.25 128 LSTM 108 LSTM flatten flatten
Layer 6 Dropout 0.25 64 Dense 2 Dense Softmax 2 Dense Softmax 32 Dense 48 Dense
Layer 7 2 Dense Softmax Dropout 0.25 - - Dense 2 Softmax Dense 2 Softmax
Layer 8 - 2 Dense Softmax - - - -
The models f∗ act as the defenders while f ′∗ as attackers. The activation function of each layer is ReLu unless specifically noted.
dataset according to the attack scenarios described in Table
I. We label all normal records as 0 and polluted records
as 1. We finally obtain the defender’s dataset Ddefender :
{M180,000×48, Y180,000×1}. We generate the dataset Dattacker
for the attacker in the same process. We note that the normal
records in both Dattacker and Ddefender are sampled from
Ddaily and there are a portion of the same records in the two
datasets. However, since there are over 2.5 million records in
Ddaily, they can be regarded as different datasets.
B. Evaluation
We evaluate our algorithm with three kinds of neural
networks, feed-forward Neural networks (FNN), recurrent
neural network (RNN), and convolutional neural network
(CNN). We train three neural networks for the utilities as
the defender models and three separate neural networks with
different structures for the attackers. The structures of the
corresponding neural networks are shown in Table II.
All our ML models are trained with the TensorFlow and
Keras library. We conduct our experiments on a Windows
10 PC with an Intel Core i7 CPU and 16 GB memory. An
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1070 graphic card is employed to
accelerate the training process. The related source code of
this paper is available on Github [17].
We manually tuned the parameter of the model training and
the performances of different models are shown in Table III.
From the table, we can learn that the RNN (LSTM) achieves
the best performance in both metrics, followed by the CNN
and FNN. This is because RNN has an inherent advantage in
learning the pattern of time-series data. Meanwhile, we can
also learn that the performances of attackers’ models are very
similar to the defenders’, which indicates that our sampled
dataset can represent the overall manifold of the raw dataset.
We set two metrics to evaluate the performance of our
attacks. The first metric will be the detection accuracy of the
defender’s ML models. Meanwhile, it is straightforward that
a fake measurement vector with a smaller profit to the energy
thief will have a higher probability to bypass the energy theft
detection. For example, if the attacker just set the parameter
α of h1 in Table I to 1− 10−5, the adversarial measurement
vector will hold a very high probability to be classified as
Table III: Model Performance
Model Accuracy False Positive Rate
fFNN 86.9% 10.01%
f ′FNN 86.87% 14.01%
fRNN 97.5% 2.58%
f ′RNN 97.48% 2.62%
fCNN 93.49% 7.79%
f ′CNN 93.28% 6.41%
normal by the utilities’ ML model. However, this will lead
to a small profit of the attacker. Therefore, we will select the
average L1-Norm of fake measurement vectors as the second
evaluation metric. In our experiment, the average L1-Norm of
all normal measurement records in Ddefender is 32.05 kWh.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm,
we set up two vanilla black-box attackers as baselines. The
first vanilla attacker VA1 will simply gradually try different
α of h1 as defined in Table I white the second vanilla
attacker VA2 generates uniformly distributed measurement
vector between 0 and a variable u. The performances of
the vanilla attackers of 1,000 fake measurement vectors are
demonstrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 respectively.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
Detection Accuracy
RNN
FNN
CNN
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
20
Mean L1 Norm
RNN
FNN
CNN
Figure 1: Vanilla Attacker 1
From Fig. 1, we can learn that the detection accuracy of the
defenders’ models decreases with the parameter α increases
under VA1 attack. As analyzed above, this indicates that
energy theft has a higher success probability if the attacker
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was willing to decrease his/her stolen profit. Overall, CNN and
RNN are more vulnerable to VA1 attack compared with FNN.
This is because the RNN and CNN can learn the time-series
pattern more accurately than FNN. However, by comparing the
two figures in Fig. 1, if the attacker wants to have a relatively
high success probability for energy theft, such as over 65%,
she/he will need to pay an over 20 kWh power consumption
bill (α > 0.65).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
Detection Accuracy
RNN
FNN
CNN
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
u
0
10
20
Mean L1 Norm
RNN
FNN
CNN
Figure 2: Vanilla Attacker 2
The performance of the VA2 attack is demonstrated in
Fig. 2. We can learn that the detection accuracy of RNN
and CNN remains high (over 95%) with parameter u in-
creases. Again, this verifies our analysis that the RNN and
CNN can learn the daily electricity consumption patterns,
and a uniform distributed consumption measurement vector is
obviously abnormal. However, the performance of the FNN
decreases dramatically if the attacker generates larger fake
measurements. Overall, the VA2 attack is not effective on
energy theft for the attacker.
We then evaluate the effectiveness of the SearchFromFree
algorithm. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 demonstrate the energy theft
detection accuracy of different ML models under the white-
box attacks and black-box attacks. The experiments were
also conducted with 1,000 generated adversarial measurement
vectors per case. From the left figure of Fig. 3 we can
learn that the detection accuracy drops dramatically with the
step increase. When step becomes larger, the RNN models’
detection accuracy is close to zero under white-box attacks and
is around 20% under black-box attacks. The FNN’s detection
accuracy is even worse under our adversarial attacks. The right
figure in Fig. 3 shows that the FNN models have no energy
theft detection ability under both white-box and black-box
attacks.
Figure 4 presents detection accuracy of CNN models under
the SearchFromFree attacks. Similar to RNN and FNN, the
detection accuracy of the CNN model drops to zero under
white-box attacks. The accuracy is slightly higher in the black-
box scenario (around 30%) but is still far from reliability.
Meanwhile, we note that a larger search size is needed to
achieve a good attack performance for black-box attacks in
our experiments.
The values of the L1-Norm of the corresponding adversarial
measurement vectors under white-box and black-box attacks
are illustrated in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 respectively. From Fig.
0 5 10 15
step
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
RNN Detection Accuracy
white-box
black-box
0 5 10 15
step
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
FNN Detection Accuracy
white-box
black-box
Figure 3: The detection accuracy of the RNNs and the FNNs.
The parameter size = 0.01 while λ = 10.
0 5 10 15 20
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0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CNN Detection Accu (white-box)
0 5 10 15 20
step
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CNN Detection Accu (black-box)
Figure 4: The detection accuracy of the CNNs. The parameter
λ = 10 in white-box attacks and λ = 0 in black-box attacks.
The white-box attack has a size = 0.01 while the black-box
attack sets size = 0.1.
5, we can learn that the compromisation parameter λ has a
larger effect on the FNN than RNN and CNN. On the other
hand, as demonstrated in Fig. 6, the L1-Norm decreases for
all models while λ increases. In our experiments, we find
that a large λ (larger than 10) will significantly decrease the
attacks’ performance on bypassing the detection. Therefore,
the attacker may prefer a relatively small λ to increase his/her
overall stolen profit in practical scenarios.
The L1 Norm of daily adversarial consumption
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Figure 5: The L1-Norm of adversarial measurement vectors
(white-box attacks). The parameters size = 0.01 and step =
14 for all three models.
By comparing Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 with Fig. 3 and Fig. 4,
we can summarize the performance of our attacks in Table
IV. The worst attack performance in our experiments in from
the black-box attack of f ′CNN (31% Accu, 1.59 kWh), which
is still effective enough for energy theft, compared with the
vanilla attacks and the 32.05 kWh normal daily consumption.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We investigate the vulnerability of ML energy theft de-
tection from the attacker’s perspective. A more reliable ML
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The L1 Norm of daily adversarial consumption
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Figure 6: The L1-Norm of adversarial measurement vectors
(black-box attacks). The parameter step = 14 for all RNN
and FNN and step = 18 for CNN. For RNN and FNN, size
is set to 0.01 while for CNN is 0.1.
Table IV: Attack Performance Summary
Attack Model Accu L1-Norm Parameters
White-box
fRNN 0.5% 0.17 Size = 0.01, λ = 10
fCNN 0.2% 0.18 Size = 0.01, λ = 10
fFNN 0% 0.76 Size = 0.01, λ = 10
Black-box
f ′RNN 21% 0.28 Size = 0.01, λ = 10
f ′CNN 31% 1.59 Size = 0.1, λ = 0
f ′FNN 0% 0.75 Size = 0.1, λ = 10
∗ The step = 18 for f ′CNN and step = 14 for the rest.
solution that is resistant to the adversarial attacks needs to be
studied in the future. The state-of-the-art defense approaches,
such as adversarial training and input reconstruction, will be
evaluated for ML-based energy theft detection in our future
work. On the other hand, energy theft is inevitable even if
ML-based detection is employed since energy thieves can
just modify the h1 attack defined in Table I with a relatively
larger α. Therefore, defense mechanisms that can significantly
decrease the energy theft profit of the attackers should also be
investigated.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ML-based energy theft detection mechanisms are
highly vulnerable to well-designed adversarial attacks. In this
paper, we study adversarial attacks in energy theft detection
and propose a general threat model. We then design the
SearchFromFree algorithm to maximize the attacker’s profit.
We evaluate our attacks with three kinds of neural networks
trained on a real-world smart meter dataset, and the results
demonstrate that energy thieves can effectively bypass the
detection of the well-trained ML models with extremely low
reported energy consumption measurements, even in black-
box attack scenarios.
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